
[US Issues a "Slap in the Face" Warning to the Carney Government for Joining Hands with Xi Jinping]
Attention is focused on the United States after it declared restrictions on military cooperation with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government, which has openly voiced anti-American and anti-Trump sentiments while joining hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s administration. The move signals a de facto partial curtailment of their military alliance, likely causing major repercussions as it could directly impact the scope of defense cooperation. Washington’s stance is firm: it will no longer offer the benefits of an alliance free of charge to a "hedging diplomacy" that leans on the US for security while tilting toward China for economic gains. For the South Korean government, which has set the "full restoration of relations" with China as a national policy goal, this is by no means someone else’s problem.

The Washington Post (WP) reported on the 20th (local time) that "US Secretary of Defense (Department of War) Pete Hegseth placed new restrictions on US-Canada defense cooperation through a secret directive last week." While WP cited US officials familiar with the decision, it noted that it had not reviewed the classified document itself. One official stated that Canada would perceive the move as a "slap in the face." However, it has not yet been confirmed which specific areas—among military exercises, exchanges, or joint planning—will actually be restricted.
This does not mean the bilateral mutual defense alliance is being scrapped. Pentagon spokesperson Sean Parnell drew a clear line, stating, "We are adjusting cooperation with Canada to ensure it contributes to America’s practical defense objectives," while adding that "the new directive does not affect defense intelligence sharing, the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), or cooperation through NATO." Therefore, the currently confirmed shift can be seen not as the termination of overall defense cooperation, but as a move by Washington to re-evaluate the scope and priorities of cooperation and tighten its conditions.
Even so, the significance of this measure is far from minor. US and Canadian forces are tightly interlocked in the defense of North America. Canada is also a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network alongside the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. Citing an official from one of the Five Eyes nations, WP reported that "while no formal changes to intelligence sharing have been notified, the volume of intelligence the US shares through various channels has decreased over the past year." This implies that even if the formal framework of cooperation remains intact, actual trust and the flow of intelligence can still erode.
[Amid Tariffs and Security Pressure, Carney Reaches Out to China]
Behind the conflict lie the Trump administration's tariff policies and Canada’s countermeasures. Citing unfair Canadian practices—such as the influx of fentanyl and protective barriers in the dairy industry—the US imposed tariffs on Canadian goods including steel, aluminum, and automobiles. Canada retaliated with counter-tariffs, and bilateral trade negotiations collapsed in August. Compounded by President Donald Trump’s remarks about annexing Canada as the "51st state" and resulting sovereignty disputes, friction between the two neighbors has escalated beyond a simple trade spat into a multifaceted conflict.
Vowing to reduce dependence on the United States, Prime Minister Carney has been expanding economic and security ties with Europe and Asia. Notably, during a summit with President Xi Jinping in Shenzhen, China, on the 17th, Carney agreed to strengthen their strategic partnership while expanding the list of items subject to tariff reductions. The Canadian Prime Minister's Office announced that as a result, "over 90 percent of bilateral trade will now be subject to reduced tariffs." The Carney government touts this as a triumph of market diversification and export expansion. Conversely, Washington has little choice but to scrutinize the impact that expanding economic ties with China will have on technology, supply chains, and security.
Although Carney remarked that expanding trade with China is not Trump’s top priority, Trump’s close associates, including Peter Navarro, were furious. President Trump’s own reaction was also sharp. After meeting Carney in Shenzhen on the 18th, Trump told reporters at the White House on the 20th, "For whatever reason, they've become arrogant. We can't let them feel that way anymore." Canada relies on the United States for roughly 70 percent of its exports. Analysts suggest that seeing such a country forge a "strategic partnership" with Washington’s primary rival while clashing with its biggest security guarantor finally exhausted Washington’s patience.
[The Alliance Framework Remains, but Trust Is Shaken]
Canada’s push to seek alternative cooperative networks in defiance of US pressure is already unfolding in plain sight. Peter Van Praagh, president of the Halifax International Security Forum and a Canadian foreign and security policy expert, warned that "the United States can no longer be expected to act as a predictable democratic leader." Canadian Minister of National Defence David McGuinty also argued, "We cannot cooperate solely through existing institutions like NATO," adding that "new methods of cooperation are needed." Citing regulations introduced in 2025 restricting attendance at think-tank events, the Trump administration barred Pentagon officials from attending the forum. While past administrations had routinely sent cabinet-level defense officials to the gathering, only a bipartisan congressional delegation attended this year.
Mutual distrust between the two nations is spilling over into military operations as well. In September, Minister McGuinty announced that Ottawa would "comprehensively review" its plan to acquire 88 F-35 fighter jets. Prime Minister Carney sparked major controversy in an interview with The New York Times by revealing that "the Canadian government had even reviewed the possibility of US-led military action." Both countries are founding members of NATO and form the Five Eyes intelligence alliance alongside the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. In Afghanistan, 158 Canadian soldiers died fighting alongside US troops. The essence of the current crisis is that even an alliance forged in blood is being redefined as "conditional."
[What South Korea Must Watch Is Not the "End of the Alliance," but the Conditions of Trust]
This development poses critical questions for South Korea as well. The era in which simply holding the status of a US ally automatically guarantees every form of cooperation and support is over. Choices an ally makes regarding defense cost-sharing, military contributions, intelligence protection, weapons system interoperability, and economic and technological cooperation with China can all be factored into Washington’s calculus. Rather than proving that the US has actually abandoned defense commitments, the Canadian case demonstrates how rapidly alliance dynamics can be recalibrated in response to domestic political and economic pressures.
Expanding trade with China or diversifying diplomatic options cannot, in itself, immediately be labeled a betrayal of an alliance. Canada, too, has valid economic reasons to pursue export market diversification, and US tariff pressure partly accelerated that push. While Canada’s exports to the US still account for around 70 percent of its total, Ottawa is actively seeking to expand into non-US markets. Ultimately, the crux of the matter lies in how a nation addresses its ally's security concerns and maintains trust while broadening its options. If Washington judges that diversifying economic cooperation leads to opacity in security cooperation, the resulting costs can spill over from trade into defense and intelligence.
Washington’s latest move should not be prematurely written off as the total collapse of the US-Canada alliance. However, the mere survival of an alliance's name and institutions does not guarantee the depth of its cooperation. Both capitals now face a test: the Carney government must decide how far to expand ties with China while repairing relations with the US, and Washington must weigh whether pressuring an ally will backfire by driving it closer to Beijing. Likewise, the more South Korea seeks to expand its diplomatic autonomy between the US and China, the more clearly it must define the principles and actions by which it will uphold the trust of its security alliance.
[Why Times Insight]
The message sent by this memo is unmistakable. The Trump administration evaluates alliances not through history or sentiment, but through a balance sheet. And that ledger records more than just defense cost-sharing ratios; it also tracks the distance an ally keeps from Washington’s core rival, China. The dual strategy of Anmi-Gyeongjung—relying on the US for security while growing the economy through the Chinese market—is no longer permitted free of charge. If not even Canada—which shares consultative bodies dating back to 1940 and the joint NORAD command—is an exception, no other ally can take automatic protection for granted.
South Korea’s situation bears striking parallels to Canada’s. Following summits in Gyeongju in November last year and Beijing in January this year, President Lee Jae-myung held his third summit with President Xi Jinping in Shenzhen on the 18th of this month. At the January summit, Lee declared he would "make 2026 the first year of the full restoration of South Korea-China relations." At the Shenzhen summit, the two sides announced the conclusion of the South Korea-China FTA services and investment negotiations, which had dragged on for eight years and eight months. During that same January meeting, Xi urged South Korea to "stand on the right side of history" and make strategic choices. Recalling that China sanctioned US subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean last year in a move targeting South Korea-US shipbuilding cooperation, those words carry considerable weight.
Yet there are crucial differences—and South Korea stands in a far more perilous position than Canada. Canada is buffered by vast oceans and the United States itself. South Korea, by contrast, faces a nuclear-armed North Korea across the Military Demarcation Line and relies on US Forces Korea and extended deterrence for its very survival. If Washington were to apply to South Korea the same formula it just used on Canada—"preserving the core axis while selectively curtailing the rest"—the fallout across combined military exercises, the depth of intelligence sharing, or wartime operational control (OPCON) transition talks could immediately translate into a security vacuum. Managing relations with China is necessary. However, the moment Seoul confuses its priorities, the price it pays will be far steeper than Canada's. The tuition Ottawa is paying today is a textbook Seoul must read in advance.

-중국 푸단대학교 한국연구원 객좌교수
-전 EDUIN News 대표
-전 OUR NEWS 대표
-제17대 대통령직인수위원회 정책기획팀장
-전 대통령실 홍보기획비서관
-사단법인 한국가정상담연구소 이사장
-저서: 북한급변사태와 한반도통일, 2012 다시우파다, 선거마케팅, 한국의 정치광고, 국회의원 선거매뉴얼 등 50여권